(1) Moscow Communique
The American newspapers which commented editorially on the results of the Moscow conference on September 17, the second day after the communique had been published, all were of the opinion that even a Communist puppet could not make imperialistic Russia renounce the strong strategic position she had secured in Manchuria by the Yalta agreement.
"Red China has 'asked' Russia to keep Soviet troops at Port Authur in Manchuria," said the Scripps-Howard newspapers, "and the Kremlin has 'consented', according to an exchange of correspondence released in Moscow. In the Far East, this is called 'saving face'. Two years ago, Russia promised to return Port Arthur to the Peiping regime by the end of this year. But the Russians do not intend to keep the agreement, so it is made to appear that the Russians are staying on at Red China's request. The excuse given for this request is that, since Japan has not signed peace treaties with Red China and the Soviets, 'conditions have arisen dangerous for peace and favorable for a renewal of Japanese aggression.' That is a bit of unconscious humor, since Japan is unarmed and could not disturb the so-called peace, even if so minded."
The paper went on to say that "No one really will be fooled by this window dressing. But it is the sort of fiction in which Oriental minds delight when confronted by disagreeable realities. Russian possession of Port Arthur serves no other purpose than to hold Red China itself in bondage by keeping a gun pointed at Peiping. Poland's 'loyalty' is similarly assured by having Russian officers command the Polish army."
The New York Times in its editorial under the title "The Soviet Grip on China" declared that "now the latest news from Moscow confirms anew that Russia is there to stay, and that not even a Communist China can dislodge the Soviets from this strategic region."
While conceding that "it would be naive to assume that the published text reveals all the decisions reached", the paper was of the opinion that "except for additional Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists, it reveals all the 'concessions' Moscow is willing to make to its Chinese 'allies'. The communique would contain all such 'concessions' because Moscow retains so much that it would necessarily have to throw in all the sops it can, in public, to enable the Chinese Communists to 'save face' and gloss over the fact not only that they return empty-handed but that they are willing to sell out China to gain Kremlin support for staying in power and doing what is essentially the Kremlin's dirty work."
The paper went on to say that apart from the 'concession' that "the Soviets agree to return to China what is China's, there is no mention of any further economic or financial aid so desperately needed for (Communist) China's reconstruction, beyond the pittance of the $300,000,000 loan advanced in 1950. And even the 'concession' published, except possibly for some revenues involved, is virtually meaningless because of the further agreement that Soviet forces will continue to stay in Port Arthur - the 'joint' Chinese-Russian naval base which they were likewise supposed to evacuate by the end of this year."
"To the Chinese," the paper concluded, "this can only mean being relegated to the role of a protectorate which the Soviet must help defend, and even Mao should be hard put to 'save face' on that point."
"Reference to Japanese aggression as the delay of the withdrawal of Russian forces may seem far-fetched, considering Japan's present condition", commented the Baltimore Sun "but at least it is historically consistent… For both China and Russia, Port Arthur is associated with Japanese hostility. And a firm grip on Port Arthur has always been one of the anchor blocks of Russian imperialism in the Far East. The difference is that this time they do not have to extort a lease on the port from the (Communist) Chinese; they just get the Chinese to invite them to stay there."
"What makes the communique so puzzling," opined the Washington Post, "is that it offers so little to Communist China." After mentioning that "the communique discloses only one Soviet concession - that the Russians intend to keep their promise to hand over the Changchun Railway by the end of this year," the paper declared that "One wonders, though, how much authority the Chinese will really have along a railway that has a Sovietized Port Arthur at one end and Soviet territory at the other. What the Chinese Communists wanted and needed most is not even mentioned in the Moscow communique. This, surely, was a firm agreement to send more Soviet planes and other war materials to Korea, and to give economic aid on a larger scale than the miserable 300 million dollars’ worth promised over a five-year period in the 1950 treaty. In general the Moscow agreement seems to be cold comfort for the Chinese Communists, who have paid so heavily in Korea for the privilege of being Russia's junior partner."
The San Francisco Chronicle in its editorial entitled "Russian 'Protectors' sit Tight" commented that "The Port Arthur arrangement, even under terms as publicly announced, is far from transient. Russian troops will stay where they are until Japan has signed a separate peace treaty with Russia and a separate peace treaty with Red China. This is likely to require many years. Soviet troops will continue to sit in Port Arthur as a military threat and economic barrier to Japan, which holds the key to the future of Asia, but which desperately needs trade with Red China if she is to survive."
The Salt Lake City Tribune editorialized to the same effect: "It is difficult to determine how Russia and China can work out peace terms with Japan in the foreseeable future unless they are successful in causing Japan to go Communist. Thus Russia may continue indefinitely its occupation of ice-free Port Arthur, vitally important military and naval-submarine base. This will enable the Soviets to tighten their hold on Manchuria."
Opinion on the subject is not, however, confined to the conventional school of thought. The London weekly, Economist, stated in its issue of September 20: "It seems just possible that the Chinese (Communist) really did ask the Russians to stay in the massive stronghold of Port Arthur, which covers the approaches to Peking, owing to fears of possible developments from the Korean war. But it is quite impossible that they sent such a team to Moscow merely to make that request. Despite the communiques, however, it is unlikely that this mountainous conference has labored for a month only to produce such a mouse… One possible explanation for their silence might be that further Soviet aid for China will be announced, with suitable trumpet flourishes, as a curtain-raiser for the coming congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and the Chinese revolutionary celebrations which also take place in October."
(2) Governor Stevenson on Asia
Governor Stevenson's reference to Asia in his foreign policy speech at San Francisco on September 9 has not passed unchallenged by the majority of the American press.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer on September 12 considered Governor Stevenson's assertion that Communism in Asia does not represent the same brand of tyranny and aggression that it does in other parts of the world as "reflecting the same kind of thinking which convinced our State Department bunglers that the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers and which, in their minds, justified the attempt to compel Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government with the Communists in 1946."
Conceding that "Governor Stevenson is now aware of the menace of the Communist tide in Asia and of the difficulties we face in dealing with it," the paper declared that "in his speech there was not one word of condemnation of those who were responsible for making it easy for the Communists to take over China. And that is not surprising, for Stevenson is in no position to criticise President Truman, nor the Secretary of State, upon whom Truman will not turn his back."
"Mr. Stevenson's proposed addition to foreign policy is couched in high-sounding terms," declared the Houston Chronicle on September 11, "but it reminds one vaguely of the ideas Henry Wallace used to express: Let's not worry about the loss of China; let's save India by helping the Indians improve their economic condition. No one can quarrel with the desirability of helping India produce more; but the governor's thesis overlooks the fact that Communism has come to other countries not because of low living standards but through armed forces. As to China, Mr. Stevenson apparently is ready to ratify the Red conquest. He foresees as a distinct possibility eventual recognition of the Red regime there."
The Scripps-Howard newspapers in their editorials under the title "Adlai's Back at Yalta" on September 10 commented: "Among the possibilities he did foresee were the eventual recognition of Red China and the liquidation of the Chinese Nationalist claim to Formosa. This suggests what Governor Stevenson means when he talks of 'negotiation'. It indicates, what he had in mind when, in a speech on May 5, he invited a 'discussion of the conditions for co-existence' with Russia. It explains his 'give and take' policy. Recognizing Red China and withdrawing recognition from Nationalist China would be all give and no take. Red China would be strengthened. Free China would be liquidated. That liquidation would disband the largest anti-communist army in Asia. Any negotiation which would result in that would give Uncle Joe a red letter day on his calendar to rival Yalta."
The McCormick newspapers on September 13 took exception to Governor Stevenson's reference to the struggle between democracy and Communism in Asia as a "civil war", and pointed out that "it was Roosevelt who decided that China was such direct concern to the United States that it was worth a war with Japan in 1941... But the New Dealers limited their interest in China to the period 1941 to 1945. Then, having ousted Japan, they walked away and let China fall to another foreign ideology - the Soviet. They let the Chinese people be dominated by force of Communist arms. They were more than indifferent to these developments. Much of the effort of the State Department and the mission of General Marshall in particular, were devoted to giving the Communists assistance in taking over China. Now Stevenson undertakes to rationalize this wholly irrational and contradictory record by imputing to Republican 'isolationists' a desire to make a war in China. The only war made over China was Roosevelt's. If the war was worth making, the outcome was worth protecting, but the New Dealers had no interest in that. When Roosevelt let Stalin into North China at Yalta, he sealed the fate of that country. Then his successors stood idly by, or, worse, gave positive assistance, while the Communists made good their conquest."
Constantine Brown in his column in the Washington Evening Star commented on September 11: "Governor Stevenson has had only a passing interest in foreign affairs. In the short time he served in the State Department he played only a minor role. He is particularly inexperienced in Asiatic problems. But Governor Stevenson in an intellectual and a student. As such he seems to have absorbed the views of liberal experts on Asia, such as Prof. Owen Lattimore's 'Solution in Asia.' He appears convinced that the present Communist strides in China and other places on that vast continent are due to Communism's offering those people something that the West does not. This, of course, is a purely intellectual and theoretical approach to the problem. The fact is that until the U.S.S.R. intervened directly in the affairs of the Asian people, we had not been confronted with the threats which face us today. But the situation is entirely different in China, which is our principal headache today. China has been a free and sovereign republic and a loyal friend of the United States for many decades. The recent policy adopted by the Administration toward the established government of China, for which we had gone to bat since 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria, has caused the subjection of 450 million people to the U.S.S.R. There was no popular revolution that brought the Peiping regime to power. Chinese, Mongolian and other Asiatic forces, strongly supported by the Kremlin, succeeded in gaining the upper hand after we abandoned the Nationalist government in 1946."
Mr. Brown was of the opinion that "The ghost writer who assisted the Democratic candidate in preparing this major speech must have either ignored or not had access to the reports the Governor receives from the Pentagon's intelligence resources. Otherwise he could not have ventured such a statement. He should have found out that even today, despite the terroristic grip of the Peiping regime, there is at least in South China a growing discontent against the Communists. Only the presence of strong and well armed military forces prevents open and large-scale rebellions."
Clyde Farnsworth, a Far Eastern affairs expert, wrote in the Scripps-Howard newspapers on September 13 that Governor Stevenson's interpretation of Far Eastern Communism is mainly based on the "Acheson-Lattimore idea that, unlike the European masses which Communism has captured physically, the Asian masses have willingly turned, or may turn, to Communism in a broad-based, revolutionary search for more abundant life."
"This demonstrably false theory", he continued, treated as fact, "was used to explain away the failure of our China policy in the State Department's white paper of 1949, ghost-written by Dr. Philip C. Jessup, a men of no Far Eastern training. It has now been adopted - straight out of the white paper – by Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson, another man of no Far Eastern background. Indeed, the man of Asian experience with whom this theory has been most prominently identified is Owen Lattimore. This line allowed the Trumen administration to write off Nationalist China and American support of that government as contrary to the manifest will of the Chinese people. One had only to be in China and witness the movement of millions of civil war refugees into the coastal cities and to the shrinking zones of Nationalist control to realize that Communism was no popular choice. True, Communism has captured many Asian minds, particularly those of a superficial urban minority - some students, frustrated intellectuals and, on less than an ideological plane, the top-flight hoodlums that do Communism's dirty work . Although Communism also has taken Asian nationalism under wing wherever it could, it remains a minority force."
Raymond Moley in the issue of September 22 of the Newsweek declared that the passage from Governor Stevenson's speech on Asia "seems to say that hundreds of millions of Chinese, out of all forms of social amelioration, have selected Communism as the best in a popular referendum and that they have selected Mao as the person best qualified to bring them the abundance they crave. It misses the hard fact that the Chinese people had little to say about it all and that they probably never weighed Communism as an answer to anything. It ignores the hard fact that China was seized and is ruthlessly exploited by a gang of revolutionaries trained in Russia and that these scoundrels are driving their puppets into battle against American troops, while across the table at Panmunjom their negotiators are lying about peace."